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Autistic development, trauma and personhood: beyond the 
frame of the neoliberal individual. 
By Damian E M Milton 
Doctoral Researcher  W University of Birmingham. 
Research Assistant  W London South Bank University. 
Head of Autism Knowledge and Expertise (Adults and Community)  W The National Autistic Society. 
Key point summary: 
- The paper critically explores notions of childhood development, particularly in regard to 
ĂƵƚŝƐŵ ?ƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƚƌĂƵŵĂƚŝĐĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶŚŽŽĚ ? ? 
- The construction of the neoliberal individual is contrasted with that of personhood as 
experienced by an autistic person. 
- Person-centred methods of engagement as outlined in this paper can give opportunities for 
opening up a respectful discursive space, where autistic development is not framed from the 
ŽƵƚƐĞƚĂƐ ‘ĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌĞĚ ?.
Introduction 
This paper critically explores notions of childhood development, particularly in regard to autism, 
ƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ƚƌĂƵŵĂƚŝĐ ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ŽĨ  ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶŚŽŽĚ ? ?  dŚĞ ƉĂƉĞƌ ďĞŐŝŶƐ ďǇ ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ Ăƚ
 ‘ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵĂůŶŽƌŵĂůĐǇ ?ĂƐĂĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚƚŚƌĞĂĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨtĞƐƚĞƌŶƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂŶĚŚŽǁ
contemporary neoliberal ideology constructs ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?  dŚŝƐ ŝĚĞĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂů ĂŶĚ
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶŚŽŽĚŝƐƚŚĞŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞof developing as an autistic person.  
The arguments presented in this paper have been influenced by a diverse range of theory, from 
<ĞůůǇ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ? WĞƌƐŽŶĂů ŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ dŚĞŽƌǇ  ?Wd ? ? ƚŽ 'ĂƌĨŝŶŬĞů ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ďƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐ ? ? ĂŶĚ
ĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚƐŽĨĚĞĐŽŶƐtruction, and goes on to explain how through a number of projects, this 
theorising was implemented to help empower both myself and other members of my family, who 
had experienced traumatic events in their childhood and/or sense of self/personhood.  In 
conclusion, it is argued that autistic development can be seen as an affront to neoliberal notions of 
functional stages of child development, and yet person-centred methods of engagement as outlined 
in this paper can give opportunities for opening up a respectful discursive space, where autistic 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŝƐŶŽƚĨƌĂŵĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚĂƐ ‘ĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌĞĚ ? ?KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ƐƵĐŚĂĐŽŶƐƚƌƵŝŶŐŽĨĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐ
development as part of natural diversity is incongruent with the pathologising narrative of 
neoliberalism.  In this sense, the  ‘double empathy problem ? between autistic and non-autistic people 
(Milton, 2012) is not only personal, but political too.  /Ŷ ĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ŽƚŚĞƌ  ‘ĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐ ǀŽŝĐĞƐ ?
(Sinclair, 1993; Sainsbury, 2000) this article will use the descriptors of  ‘ĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐƐƉĞĐƚƌƵŵ ? P
 “tĞĂƌĞŶŽƚƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽ “ũƵƐƚŚĂƉƉĞŶƚŽŚĂǀĞĂƵƚŝƐŵ ? ?ŝƚŝƐŶŽƚĂŶĂƉƉĞŶĚĂŐĞƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚ
from who we are as people, nor is it something shameful that has to be reduced to a sub-ĐůĂƵƐĞ ? ?
(Sainsbury, 2000: 12). 
Western society and its strong drive toward central coherence 
One of the dominant psychological theoretical explanations of autism suggests that autistic people 
ŚĂǀĞĂ ‘ǁĞĂŬĚƌŝǀĞƚŽǁĂƌĚĐĞŶƚƌĂůĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ?ĚĞƉŝĐƚĞĚůĂƌŐĞůǇĂƐĂĚĞĨŝĐŝƚŽƌŝŵƉĂirment compared 
ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶĞƵƌŽ-ŶŽƌŵ ? ? ^ƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐƉĞŽƉůĞŵĂǇŚĂǀĞĂ particular strength in processing 
details because of a lack in the ability to synthesise information quickly and gain meanings.  It is an 
interesting exercise however, if one reverses the gaze and considers the predominant typical 
ŶĞƵƌŽƚǇƉĞ ?ŽƌĂƚůĞĂƐƚŝƚƐĨĂŶĐŝĨƵůĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐĂ ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐĚƌŝǀĞƚŽǁĂƌĚĐĞŶƚƌĂůĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?.  
KŶĞĐĂŶƐĂǇƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƚŚƌĞĂĚŝŶtĞƐƚĞƌŶƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŶŐWůĂƚŽ ?ƐĨŽƌŵƐ ?,ŽďďĞƐ ?ǀŝĞǁƐŽĨƚhe 
ĚĞƐĐĞŶƚŽĨŵĂŶǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƵƌŬŚĞŝŵ ?ƐĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐŽĨ
Talcott Parsons; containing a desire for coherence and consensus.  Some of these theorists noticed 
however, that with this drive toward hegemonic normativity, one will always have those who do not 
fit: the pathologically dysfunctional deviant minority. 
 “dŚĞǁĞďŽĨĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞƚŚĞǁĞďŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŝƐĨĂƚĂůůǇĞŶƚĂŶŐůĞĚŝŶ
ŝƚ ? ?DĂƌĐƵƐĞ (1964: 123). 
Within current hegemonic norms, the notion of the fully independent, neoliberal functional 
individual, the social agent who is responsible for their actions, has become the ideal to which 
pathological deviance is contrasted, creating categories of those who can pass as  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ? ƚŚŽƐĞ
who severely struggle to pass, and those who cannot (and/or may not wish to).  Each could be said 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŽďĞĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐ ?dŚŝƐĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĂůůŽǁĨŽƌ
the celebration of diversity in all its fŽƌŵƐ ?ĂŶĚĐƌĞĂƚĞƐĂŶ ‘ƵƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŵ ?ŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚ ‘othering ? of 
an ever-increasing number of people. 
Within the history of Western philosophy there has also been a tradition that has not highlighted 
solidity, structure and consensus however, but rather fluid and transactional processes.  From 
Heraclitus to contemporary postmodernist theory such a tension has existed.  Postmodernist 
theorists such as Foucault (1972, 1973) and Deleuze and Guttari (1972, 1980) reject notions of 
structure, massification, meta-narratives and conformity; individual identity is seen as in a state of 
constant becoming, and notions of difference and multiplicity not consumed by binary 
categorisations. 
Fragmented perception ĂŶĚďƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂŶ ?ĂƵƚ-ĞƚŚŶŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ? ? 
A popular technique within critical disability studies is that of the auto-ethnography.  A method that 
ĨŽĐƵƐĞƐƵƉŽŶƚŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƌ ?ƐŽǁŶƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƵƉŽŶƚŚŝƐƚŽĐŽŶŶĞĐƚƐƵĐŚƐŝƚƵĂƚĞĚ
understandings to wider cultural, political and social meanings and discourse (Milton, 2014b).  A 
common feature of this interpretive method however, is the notion that one builds a coherent story 
of identity over time.  Not only does this take on the hue of neoliberalism, it is also an experience 
that may not be applicable to some autistic ways of being in the world. 
A number of cognitive psychological research studies have suggested that people on the autistic 
ƐƉĞĐƚƌƵŵ ƐŚŽǁ Ă  ‘ĚĞĨŝĐŝƚ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ĞƉŝƐŽĚŝĐ ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ? ǇĞƚ ĂŶ
accompanying strength in semantic factual memory (Millward et al. 2000, Goddard et al. 2007, 
Crane and Goddard, 2008, Goldman, 2008).  Rather than taking a deficit model of autism, one can 
view such differences in perception and memory construction as embodied differences that can 
impact on the social lifeworld experienced by autistic people.  However, such development as an 
autistic person could also be seen as an affront to the construction of the functional and productive 
independent neoliberal individual identity and notions of selfhood: 
 “Ŷ ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƚƌĂŝƚ ƐƚĂƌƚƐ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ? Ă ŚĂůůƵĐŝŶĂƚŽƌǇ ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ? ƐǇŶĞƐƚŚĞƐŝĂ ? ƉĞƌǀĞƌƐĞ
mutation, or play of images shakes loose, challenging the hegemony of the signifier. In the case of 
the child, gestural, mimetic, ludic, and other semiotic systems regain their freedom and extricate 
themselves from the "tracing," that is, from the dominant competence of the teacher's language - a 
ŵŝĐƌŽƐĐŽƉŝĐĞǀĞŶƚƵƉƐĞƚƐƚŚĞůŽĐĂůďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨƉŽǁĞƌ ? ? ?ĞůĞƵǌĞĂŶĚ'ƵƚƚĂƌŝ ? ? ? ? ?: 15). 
As an autistic person, my own sense of identity is not a coherent one, nor is it a completely fluid 
identity.  For me, memories and sense of self are experienced as fragments, painstakingly structured 
and constructed to make patterns.  Such patterns are movable, yet they shift and alter each time 
one attempts to view them (Milton, 2013a).  Personally this is not a deficit to be remediated, but a 
difference to be acknowledged and worked with.  Such a way of being in the world contains a 
tension between continuity and discontinuity and is more akin to a rhizomatic model of becoming, a 
milieu without bouŶĚĂƌŝĞƐ ?ĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůůǇĞǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌ-ďĞŝŶŐ ? ? Thus, one might ask: what would an 
ŝŶĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚĂŶĚŶŽŵĂĚŝĐ ‘ĂƵƚ-ĞƚŚŶŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ůŽŽŬůŝŬĞ (Milton, 2013a, 2014b)? 
Personal Construct Theory (PCT). 
It is not only autistic people who might have a fragmented experience of self-development over 
time.  The construction of personal narratives can also be radically altered for those who have 
memory challenges following head injury, or through reactions to personal trauma.  In the 
construction of a personal narrative, there are a number of ways in which visual media such as 
photography can be utilised.  This can include photo-montage or collage (Ridout, 2014), giving a 
camera to young participants in research to capture what is of meaning for them in a given situation, 
photo-sorting and Q-sort methodology (Milton, 2014c), and many more. 
My own theorising in this area dates back to projects carried out with my mother (Milton, 2002).  
These projects involved the use of photography with respect to individuals who struggled to 
compose personal narratives of self.  These projects were influenced by a number of theoretical 
antecedents, the first of which being the Personal Construct Theory (PCT) of George Kelly (1905-
1967).   
PCT developed as a pragmatic theory through <ĞůůǇ ?Ɛ psychotherapy practice.  At the time of 
conception, such therapy was dominated by two divergent schools of thought: Psychoanalysis and 
Behaviourism.  Both perspectives were vastly different to one another, yet both took the standpoint 
that people were moved to act by forces largely outside of their own control.  In contrast, PCT saw 
the person as an agent, making choices and decisions and acting upon them.  This conceptualisation 
would not divorce actions from the context within which people act, but for Kelly (1955), it was the 
constructions that an individual places on events that shapes the meanings they form and the 
reactions they have to events.  Thus, the starting point for PCT was the idiosyncratic ways in which 
people make sense of the world and how that leads to social action. 
Such an approach to personal constructions draws heavily on a phenomenological approach, 
attempting to approach issues through the viewpoint of the individual experiencing them, rather 
than fitting them into a priori theories.  Kelly (1955) ƵƐĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀŝƐŵ ? ƚŽ
suggest that there were many differing ways of perceiving and making sense out of the same thing 
Žƌ ĞǀĞŶƚ ? ĂŶĚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƐĞĞŝŶŐ ĂŶǇ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ  ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ? ? ŽŶĞ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ůŽŽŬ ƉƌĂŐŵĂtically at 
ŚŽǁ ƵƐĞĨƵů ƐƵĐŚ Ă ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐ ŝƐ ƚŽ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ?  For Kelly (1955), following on from the work of 
Mead (1934), social roles were not fixed positions, but something navigated by an individual in their 
interactions with others.  Importantly in the context of autism, it involved placing oneself in the 
position of the other with whom one was interacting ? ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ ŽŶĞ ĐŽƵůĚ ĂĚũƵƐƚ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ social 
performance accordingly: 
"He [George Kelly] argued that there were two ways of treating other people.  You can relate to 
others in the way that the early behaviourists thought normal, and treat them as 'behaving 
mannequins'.  Only psychopaths do this, he claimed.  The moral way to relate is to act in the light of 
the other person's view of things.  In other words, taking their thoughts and feelings into 
consideration." (Butt, 2008: 13). 
Autistic people are often deemed to lack the ability to relate to others.  Empathy is a two-way 
process, thus I would contend ƚŚĂƚƚŽůŽĐĂƚĞƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞĨŝĐŝƚ ? in the autistic mind is an ableist theory.  It is 
often autistic people who are the ones deemed (in this sense) to be 'behaviourist psychopaths', 
ǁŚĞŶĂůůƚŽŽŽĨƚĞŶƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŽĨĂůĂĐŬŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŵŝŶĚ ?combined with behaviourist ideology are 
used to frame the  ‘lifeworld ? of autistic people from the outside, and consequently are often 
rejected by the way autistic people construe themselves (Milton, 2012, 2014a; Milton and Bracher, 
2013).  Indeed, the current media tendency to equate autism with psychopathic behaviour (Park, 
2014) can be seen as a powerful construction being fed by notions of autistic people lacking 
empathy or as being empty vessels in need of behavioural remediation.  Such constructions and 
ways of construing autism, as being defined by a lacking or deficieŶƚ  ‘ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ŵŝŶĚ ? ?are 
dehumanising and disempowering, denying autistic people a voice in their own affairs.  Indeed, 
rather than there being such a deficit in the minds of autistic people, I have previously argued that a 
 ‘ĚŽƵďůĞĞŵƉĂƚŚǇƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ĞǆŝƐƚƐ ? that indicates an inherent difficulty for both parties to understand 
the way of being, construing, and acting of the other (Milton, 2012, 2014a).  One could even say that 
suggesting a deficit in theory of mind in autistic people is a form of projection of what is being done 
to autistic people.  When conceived of in this way, the power differential with regard to who it is 
that produces knowledge about autism can be seriously questioned (Milton and Bracher, 2013, 
Milton, 2014a).   
Kelly (1955) envisaged the personal construct to be ways of construing events along bipolar 
continuums, e.g. from happy to sad, anxious to relaxed.  This is not to say constructions are of the 
nature of either/or extremes, but can be placed along continuums.  Placed together these 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞĂ ‘ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶ  ?ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƚĞůůƐƵƐůŝƚƚůĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂů
event, but tells us a lot about how someone is construing an event.  Constructs are more than just 
conceptualisations however, as they are both ways of reflecting upon phenomena and of motivating 
social action.  Construing can also be seen as something that is an active process, rather than 
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƐƚĂƚŝĐƚŚĂƚŽŶĞ ‘ŚĂƐ ? ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ĂĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐŶŽƚĂĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĞŶƚŝƚǇĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐŝŶĂ 
vacuum, but is socially and discursively situated. 
According to PCT, there is ŶŽƐƵĐŚƚŚŝŶŐĂƐĂƐƚĂƚŝĐ  ‘ƐĞůĨ ? ?ĂƐĂĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĞŶƚŝƚǇŵĂĚĞƵƉŽĨ  ‘ƚƌĂŝƚƐ ? ?
Equally, an individual is not seen as an empty vessel moved to act by outside forces alone, rather 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ, or as later post-ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐƚƐŵĂǇŚĂǀĞƐĂŝĚ ?Ă ‘ůŝŶĞŽĨ
ĨůŝŐŚƚ ? (Deleuze and Guttari, 1980).  To make sense of this phenomenon, Kelly suggested that people 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉ  ‘ĐŽƌĞ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐ ? Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ŽĨtheir construct systems, which are therefore essential 
ǁĂǇƐ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐĞůĨ ? ?  /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐĞůĨ ? ŝƐ ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ ƐƚĂƚŝĐ ŶŽƌ
fluid, not working with a psychological vacuum nor totally driven by external forces, but as a 
personally cŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ ‘ĐůƵŵƉŝŶŐ ?ŽĨŵĞĂŶŝŶg-making activity (Milton, 2013a, 2014a, 2014b ? ?Ă ‘ƐĞůĨ-
ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ? 
Kelly (1955) and later theorists in the field produced a number of techniques and methods for 
investigating the meaning making strategies and construct systems that people employ, the most 
ĨĂŵŽƵƐ ŽĨǁŚŝĐŚ ďĞŝŶŐ <ĞůůǇ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ  ‘ƌĞƉĞƌƚŽƌǇ ŐƌŝĚ ? ? dŚŝƐ ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐ ĞůŝĐŝƚŝŶŐ Ă ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ
 ‘ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶĂƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƉĞŽƉůĞƐŽŵĞŽŶĞŝƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ?ŽƌĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ
or organisations someone is involved with) and a number of constructs about these elements.  One 
way in which this is elicited is to ask how two elements are similar to one another, but different to a 
third.  This produces a grid, where the individual can rate on a numerical scale how much constructs 
relate to the various elements in question.  What this technique does is produce a way of mapping 
how that individual is construing an event.  The technique was not devised to be used in a 
mechanistic way, but as a way of strategically enquiring about how someone is making sense of 
pheonemna. 
 “dŚĞ ƌƵůĞƐ ŽĨ ůŽŐŝĐ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ĂƉƉůǇ ŝŶ Ă ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ?  /ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ? ǁĞ ƐĞĞ ĂŶ ŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƚŝĐ
psycho-ůŽŐŝĐŝŶŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?Ƶƚƚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? 
ŶŽƚŚĞƌ ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ƵƚŝůŝƐŝŶŐ Wd ǁĂƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ  ‘ƚŚĞ ^ĂůŵŽŶ ůŝŶĞ ? ŶĂŵĞĚ ĂĨƚĞƌ ŝƚƐcreator 
Phillipa Salmon (2003).  This technique asks an individual to draw a line with words representing 
opposite extremes at each end (e.g. anxious to relaxed).  The individual is then asked to place 
themselves along this line and where they would like to be in future.  The individual is then asked to 
write or talk about how they think they will get from one point to the other.  It is in this discursive 
space that for Salmon (2003), the learning experience takes place.  Similar techniques have also 
ďĞĞŶĚĞǀŝƐĞĚǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ƌĞĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŝĚĞĂů ?ƐĞůĨ-image (of course with both 
being seen as constructions), or of the organisation one works within.  Such techniques have helped 
inspire participatory work with autistic children (Moran, 2006, Williams and Hanke, 2007, 
Greenstein, 2013). 
It is also of great relevance to the understanding of the use of construct systems by autistic people, 
that Kelly (1955) theorised that the construing and meaning-making process of human beings begins 
prior to language development.  Thus the construction of meaning and positionality in this view can 
be built upon sensory and emotional reactions to events without the need for linguistic 
interpretation, and yet goes beyond the simple stimulus-response conceptualisation of 
behaviourism.  This presents an interesting dilemma however, as to how one might be able to build 
a dialogue with a less-verbal or non-verbal autistic person.  The visual methods utilised by Williams 
and Hanke (2007 ? ǁŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďůĞ ƚŽ Ăůů ? ǇĞƚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƚĂůŬŝŶŐ ŵĂƚƐ ? ? ƐŽƌƚŝŶŐ
photographs ?Žƌ ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ĂŶ ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĂƉƉŽƌƚ ǁŝƚŚ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ? Ă ‘ŵĂƉ ?ŽĨ ŚŽǁ ĂŶ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ŝƐ
construing the world may be able to be built, however incomplete that map may be.  This should 
always be seen as an ongoing process of interaction though.   
tŚĂƚŝĨŽŶĞŚĂƐĂ ?ƌŚŝǌŽŵĂƚŝĐ ?ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? 
In previous articles, I have argued that the construct system employed by autistic people may well 
be divergent from those of non-autistic people, due to differences in both neurological embodiment 
and cultural understanding (Milton, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b).  In this conceptualisation, 
autistic ways of being can be seen as being constructĞĚĂƐ ‘ƌŚŝǌŽŵĂƚŝĐ ? ?Ăpsycho-logic system that 
has no parameters, no hierarchy nor status, but seemingly endless connections.  This can lead to a 
tendency to not  ‘Ĩŝůů ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŐĂƉƐ ? ŝŶ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ-making by using previously learnt schema (Milton, 
2013b), or alternatively, a tendency toward building a concrete and rigid construct system as a 
defensive strategy, or constructing a fragmented construct system, which can mean anything from a 
ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚĞĚ ‘ĞŵďƌĂĐŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞĐŚĂŽƐ ?ƚŽĂƚƌĂƵmatic loss of a sense of self altogether (Caldwell, 2014, 
Milton, 2014b).  As previously mentioned in this theoretical account, autistic people can sometimes 
have quite an incoherent sense of self over time (Milton, 2014b ? ?  &Žƌ ƐŽŵĞ ?ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐŽĨŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
personal construct system may be better suited to non-linear activities. 
Childhood trauma and the personal construction of self 
The initial theorising that began with my mother (Milton, 2002) led to a number of projects involving 
the personal construction of self following family trauma.  The first of these was the construction of 
an alternative family album.  This method involved collecting together photographs of family history, 
yet without the usual emphasis of the traditional family album, of presenting a happy and functional 
family unit.  Instead, photographs were selected on the basis of the personal emotional impact of 
tŚĞŵ ? Žƌ  ‘ƉƵŶĐƚƵŵ ?  ?ĂƌƚŚĞƐ ?  ? ? ? ?). With each photograph, both my mother and I wrote 
descriptions of the personal relevance the photographs held.  This was completed in isolation from 
one another and then compiled in chronological order and placed into a booklet.  At the centre of 
the booklet were two blank pages, representing a traumatic event in our family history: that of a 
multi-car road traffic accident that led to my mother sustaining disabling multiple injuries and severe 
psychological trauma to myself.  This project opened up a space in which to talk about traumatic 
events of the past and how each of us had our own personal interpretations of these events, such a 
dialogue helped us both to communicate and express our own perceptions and understandings. 
Following the road traffic accident, my previous set of beliefs and constructs about the world were 
shattered into tiny fragments.  The mainstay of my previous existence being my mother, the 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŽĨ ‘ĐĂƌĞƌ ?ǁĂƐƌĞǀĞƌƐĞĚĂŶĚŶŽƚŝŽŶƐƐƵĐŚĂƐĐŚŝůĚŚŽŽĚĂŶĚƐĞůĨ-identity begun to dissolve, 
leading to a very psychologically turbulent time through my teenage years (Milton, 2014b).  The 
alternative family album project, not only helped me and my mother to connect to one another, but 
helped me to connect my new sense of self with that of my former childhood and find consistencies 
between them. 
Such a linear narrative was however deconstructed in the next project my mother embarked upon 
entitled:  ?BĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĨƌĂŵĞ ? (Milton, 2002).  Again, this project involved reflection upon a set of 
family photographs, exploring the tensions and traumas that the personal narratives contained.  My 
mother discovered five photographs that had been taken of her and her sister in 1956.  These 
ƉŚŽƚŽŐƌĂƉŚƐǁĞƌĞƚĂŬĞŶŽŶƚŚĞĚĂǇƚŚĂƚŵǇĂƵŶƚǁĂƐ ‘ďĂŶŝƐŚĞĚ ? (to live with their father in another 
country) since their mother was literally obliterating her existence fƌŽŵ ŚĞƌ ƐŽĐŝĂů  ‘ůŝĨĞǁŽƌůĚ ?for 
having been born with brain damage.  From that day forth my aunt was never referred to or seen by 
her mother.  This profound fracture could have caused an entire separation of the sisters, however 
their childhood memories of that event proved to be extremely similar when they individually 
assessed their own memories of that fateful day, and, the act of ŵǇĂƵŶƚ ?Ɛ voice being heard and an 
equal partner in the project ensured a renewal of their bond.  By the subversive act of bypassing the 
dominant voice they were able to repair the emotional damage that further disabled my aunt and 
ůĂƚƚĞƌůǇŵǇŵŽƚŚĞƌ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ  ‘ƚŚĞĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚŚĞƌŽǁŶƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚĂůƚĞƌĞĚ ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇǁŝƚŚŝŶ ĨĂŵŝůǇ
dynamics. 
dŚŝƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?concepts of deconstruction and discontinuity to explore the 
personal narratives of my mother and aunt concerning their separation as children and how they 
subverted the dominant narrative regarding disability, which came from their own mother and was 
the reason for their initial separation.  The focus of the project was to examine the trauma sustained 
ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů  ‘ŝŶŶĞƌ-ƐĞůĨ ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ
disability throughout their lives.  One can therefore view these projects as being compatible with the 
concept ŽĨ ‘ƉƐǇĐŚŽ-emotioŶĂůĚŝƐĂďůŝƐŵ ?  ?Ğ ?Ő ?ZĞĞǀĞ ? ? ? ? ?), a concept that I and others have since 
applied to the experiences of autistic people (Milton and Moon, 2012). 
Through a collaborative process, my mother and aunt explored how disability and the  ‘othering ? 
process produced fractures in our family history, and in doing so discovered an ever-changing sense 
of identity, one that could never be fully realised.  Yet, through this process they both reached a 
sense of mutual fulfilment in asserting their own voices regarding their own personal histories. 
 “ǀĞƌǇ ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ĂŶĚ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ƵŶŝƋƵĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ? ĞǀĞŶ ŝĨ ƚŚĞǇ ƐŚĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐĂŵĞ ? ĞǀĞŶƚ ? ?
(Milton, 2002). 
In this project, my mother expressed how meanings associated with historical traumas were always 
ĞƐĐĂƉŝŶŐ ďĞŝŶŐ ĨƵůůǇ ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ ŽĨƚĞŶ ůĂǇ  ‘ďĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĨƌĂŵĞ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉŚŽƚŽŐƌĂƉŚ ?  Thus, in the 
installation piece that my mother created from the project, influenced by Derrida (1988), she 
suggested that when engaging with the piece, there was something always unreadable in terms of 
meaning, what Derrida (1988) termed as the parergon.  It is also interesting to note at this juncture, 
that it has also been argued that autistic people may struggle to read the subtext of the social 
interaction of others, being literal in interpretation.  For autistic people, it may be the case that the 
parergon lacks meaning and tangibility, being too ethereal to grasp (Milton, 2013a, 2013b).  
Influenced by these theories, my mother decided to crop and re-present aspects and details of the 
photographs.  These fragments were then accompanied by fragments from two independently 
recorded monologues from my mother and aunt that had been triggered by their responses to the 
discovered photographs.  This was placed within an installation piece set above a family 
mantelpiece.  This multi-sensory experience disrupted assumptions of family life for those viewing it 
and the dominant family narrative that had led to the further disablement of both my mother and 
aunt. 
 “dŚĞ ǁŽƵŶĚƐ ŽĨ ƚƌĂƵŵĂ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ? ŽƉĞŶůǇ ĞǆƉŽƐĞĚ ĨƌĞĞĨƌŽŵ ƐƵƉƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?..the unsettling 
exposure of hidden narratives. ? ?DŝůƚŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
This installation used deconstruction as a mode of questioning the visual narrative of photographic 
representation, and how such representations inhabit emotional and subjective experiences.  By 
deconstructing the dominant family narrative, and by distorting and cropping images, interspersed 
by fragments of vocal narration from both sisters, this project was able to express the emotional 
ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚŚŽŽĚ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƚƌĂƵŵĂ ? ŐŝǀŝŶŐ  ‘ǀŽŝĐĞ ? ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐĂďůĞĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ
microcosm of family power dynamics.   
Both projects looked into the notion of trauma, as a reaction and personal construing of an event 
that damaged some of the core constructs of selfhood for those involved.  Trauma was thus 
conceptualised as a permanent discontinuity with ĂƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƐĞůĨ ?dŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ďƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐ ?
 ?'ĂƌĨŝŶŬĞů ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁĂƐĂůƐŽƵƐĞĚ ?ǇĞƚŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƚƌĂƵŵĂ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂůĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ?ŝƐƵŶĂďůĞƚŽƋƵŝĐŬůǇ
rebuild itself, and in some cases is almost entirely fractured (Milton, 2014b). 
 “tŚĂƚ ĚĞǀĂƐƚĂƚĞƐ Žne individual will not necessarily have the same effect on another...This is 
because different sense is made of the same event.  Of course, this does not deny the massive effect 
of what is termed trauma.  But it directs our attention to the sense-making process of personal 
construction.  It makes us re-think the nature and definition of post-traumatic stress disorder 
 ?Wd^ ? ? ? ?Ƶƚƚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?
What Butt (2008) suggests here is that the trauma comes from the meaning endowed onto an event, 
rather than the event itself (which is of course is still important to the reaction / creation of 
meaning).  However if anything were to breach or damage ĂŶ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?
particulĂƌůǇĂƚĂ ‘ĐŽƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ ?ůĞǀĞů ? it is potentially traumatising.  Perhaps it is no wonder that the 
 ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ? ŝƐ ƚŽ ĚĞĨĞŶĚ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ĐŽƌĞ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ Ăƚ Ăůů ĐŽƐƚƐ ?  ^ŽŵĞ ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐ
might conceive of such defensiveness as a form of  ‘ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĚŝƐƐŽŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?&ĞƐƚŝŶŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?).
 “ŶǇĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƉĂƌƚŽĨĂƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĂƉĂĐŬĂŐĞĚĞĂů ?ĂŶĚĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐƌĞǀĞƌďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĂƚ
system.  In this sense then, our freedom is not absolute, as Sartre would have it.  It is always to be 
seen within the context of a personal construct systĞŵ ? ? ?Ƶƚƚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? 
And Butt (2008) continues: 
 “ĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂů ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƚĂĐŬůŝŶŐ  ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ  ?ďƵƚ ŶŽƚ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ? ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐ ƚŚĞ
ƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŽĨĂǁŝĚĞƌĚŝƐƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚŚĞŶĐĞƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĐůŝĞŶƚ ? ? ?Ƶƚƚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? 
To add to Buƚƚ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ŚĞƌĞ ? ŽŶĞ ĐĂŶ ĂůƐŽ ůŽĐĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ƵƚŝůŝƐĞ within a 
wider social and discursive dynamic too.  At worst, behavioural regimes can be seen as a control 
mechanism employed by surveillance staff to discipline and punish those that have had their 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶŚŽŽĚ  ‘ŽƚŚĞƌĞĚ ? leading to further psycho-emotional disablement of their identity 
development (Milton and Moon, 2012). 
/ŶƚŚĞ ‘ĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞĨƌĂŵĞ ?ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?Ŷo simplistic resolutions to trauma were to be found, but a sense 
of fracture and incompletion.  The othering of disability within the family itself caused fractures in 
the family narrative that simply are not  ‘resolvable ?.  Yet, by subverting the dominant narrative, a 
more fulfilled and empowering (yet incomplete) narrative could be constructed. 
Both these projects were completed before my son and I were diagnosed as being on the autism 
spectrum, yet the notion of fragmentation and fracture became a construct that helped me to make 
sense of my own sense of self over time (Milton, 2014b).  In the figure below, you can see a collage 
that I created at a workshop at the Autscape conference (Milton and Ridout, 2014).  In this collage, 
there are two rhizomatic formations, on the left my sense of self prior to self-identification as being 
on the autism spectrum, and on the right my sense of self after that time (including being 
diagnosed). 
(Images  W see attached  W Figure 1.1: My sense of self prior to diagnosis, Autscape 2014.  Figure 1.2: 
My sense of self post-diagnosis, Autscape 2014.) 
Conclusion 
Autistic development could be said to be an affront to neoliberal notions of functional stages of child 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŽĂ ‘ŚĞĂůƚŚǇ ?ĂŶĚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?ĂƐ  ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ƐĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŽ over-ĐŽŶĨŽƌŵŝƚǇ ?
(Milton, 2012 ? ?  DĂŶǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚ ƚŽ  ‘ƚƌĞĂƚ ? ĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐƉĞŽƉůĞ ĂƌĞ ŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ
embedded within ableist notions of normalcy and pathology.  The subjectivities of autistic children 
and of autistic adults regarding their own childhoods are often trivialised in attempts to teach 
autistic children how to act less autistic (Milton and Moon, 2012). 
In order to redress the gap created by the  ‘double empathy problem ? (or the mismatched salience of 
differing dispositions and constructions of the social lifeworld) between autistic and non-autistic 
people (Milton, 2012, 2014a), it is suggested here that autistic people be seen as having their own 
personal constructions of the world, and that methods deriving from PCT could be useful in building 
mutual rapport and understanding.  All too often however, the opposite is the case.  I would also 
suggest that when utilising PCT, links need to be made between the personal constructions an 
individual utilises, whether in this case it be an autistic person, or a practitioner working with an 
autistic person, and the wider interpretive/discursive repertoires that they are drawing upon and 
employing to make sense of the world.  In this sense, the double empathy problem can be seen to 
be deeply embedded within unequal power relations (Milton and Bracher, 2013, Milton, 2014a).  
Such methods do however give opportunities for opening up a respectful discursive space, where 
ĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŝƐŶŽƚĨƌĂŵĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚĂƐ ‘ĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌĞĚ ?.  Of course, such a construing of 
autistic development as part of natural diversity is incongruent with the pathologising narrative of 
neoliberalism.  In this sense, the double empathy problem between autistic and non-autistic people 
is not only personal, but political too. 
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